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The Tariff, Laissez-Faire, and Federation •In Colonial Queensland
Queensland's tariff was no more than a compromise between pro-
tection and free trade seems to me to be mistaken. In what
follows I shall re-assess the tariff's development by taking into
consideration its wider economic and political context.
by
*G. Lewis, B.Econ. (Hons.), Ph.D.
The purpose of this article is to review the development of
the Queensland tariff in a relatively broad economic setting and to
note the politics of colonial tariff policies. Such a discussion
casts light on the question of government involvement with the
economy and on the economics of Federation in the northern
Colony and State. Although a knowledge of the main tariff The Major Fiscal Changes
policies is an essential step towards understanding the structure Queensland followed a moderate free trade line from its
and timing of colonial economic growth the question has been foundation until the mid-'eighties, then the tide turned in favour
slow to attract historical attention. Queensland's best nineteenth of moderate protection. The division between the two phases was
century historians, Coote 1 and Knight 2, did not discuss the not sharp; even during the first period sugar was protected by
matter. Other writers, such as Weedon 3, W. F. Morrison 4, bounties and import duties 12. Queensland's tariffs were invari-
Bernays 5, and Lack 6, also had little to say about it. The first ably pragmatic and the fiscal issue never assumed the same
to call attention to the tariff were Coghlan and Allin. Coghlan proportions as in New South Wales or Victoria. The main tariff
commented mainly on the 1860s and 1870s and pointed out that revisions were made in 1866, 1870, 1874, 1888, and 1892. The
Queensland's tariff policies invariably had been pragmatic 7. Allin phase of free trade dominance culminated between 1874 and 1879
was more concerned with inter-colonial tariff relations. He added when there took place the most prolonged bout of tariff discussion.
detail to Coghlan's picture but his interpretation was less satis- By the early 1880s protection was becoming more influential and
factory 8. the protectionist apogee came between 1888 and 1892. Although
When the Queensland tariff was first brought to historical the second fiscal debate was pitched in a lower key than its pre-
attention, there was no agreement as to what tariff policy had decessor, the protectionists were in the ascendant. The issue
been. This divergence of opinion continued for some time. In receded with the continuing debate over the depression, the strikes,
1933 G. V. Portus commented that Queensland had followed the and coloured labour, until it flared up finally over Federation, yet.
lead of New South Wales in her fiscal policy 9, while in 1955 there was no movement back towards free trade 13.
1. D. McNaughtan stated that Queensland had kept a position The connection between economic recession and protection
between protection and free trade 10. With the recent publi- as an expedient was made clear during the 1866 crisis. The new
cation of G. D. Patterson's study, however, we now have the first seven and a half percent ad valorem duties were the response of
full historical account of the Queensland tariff. Patterson's con- a government in urgent need of funds 14. It was not a rigorously
clusion is that although there was a gradual increase of duties protective schedule. Higher rates were levied on drink and tobacco,
through the century, neither protection nor free trade had been but ~heat and flour were not taxed, and later in the year sugar
a dogmatic policy. Queensland, like the other smaller colonies, machl?ery was again exempted. Some Brisbane merchants' repre-
had steered a course lying between the two extremes taken by sentatlves, such as Theophilus Pugh 15, had argued for a wider
New South Wales and Victoria 11. While this conclusion is close extension of the tariff while William Groom 16 the advocate of
to Coghlan's and McNaughtan's earlier verdicts, the opinion that Downs agrarian inte;ests, had pressed for ad export duty on
* Tutor in History, University of Queensland.
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pastoral products. Yet neither could move the Government
towards higher duties at that time 17.
The next major change came in 1870 after Palmer's ministry
had replaced Lilley's. The Treasurer, Robert Ramsay, placed six-
pence a bushel on wheat, raised spirit duties, and removed sugar
and farming machinery from the exemption list 18. More contro-
versially, Ramsay proposed a flour tax. But this was too much of
an innovation. It was rejected and ad valorem duties went up to
ten percent instead. Ramsay took pains to represent the tariff as
being solely for revenue purposes 19, yet some members saw it as
the beginning of moderate protection. McIlwraith chose to do
so 20, although Lilley described it as a continuation of his earlier
free trade policies 21 • It was really neither one nor the other.
In the next few years seasons improved and the current ran
more strongly in favour of freer trade. In 1872 the gold export
duty was abolished and in 1874 Macalister's tariff reduced ad
valorem rates to five percent and replaced sugar and agricultural
machinery on the free list. These changes were welcomed but the
hopes that were expressed about expansion were unjustified 22.
Although there was an intense fiscal argument during the deterior-
ating economic conditions of the later 1870s, there was no going
back to even the expedient protection of 1870 23 •
The prosperity of the years 1880 to 1884 made Queenslanders
forget about their tariff debate, yet the duties scale gradually
inclined towards protection. After small readjustments upwards
in 1885 and 1886, McIlwraith's 1888 schedule removed the impost
on wheat and retained the 1885 five percent duty on agricultural
machinery, while ad valorem rates went up to fifteen percent. The
Brisbane Courier argued that the new charges were indicative of
a revenue tariff 24 but the general opinion was that protection had
arrived and would probably stay 25. With the onset of the depres-
sion protection was increased and by 1892 ad valorem rates rose
as high as twenty-five percent. McIlwraith had even taxed
imported flour - a measure which had not been attempted since
1870. Some still saw the tariff as only moderate protection as
two other rates of fifteen percent and five percent were charged
on many articles instead of the twenty-five percent rate. This
flexibility, however, was as much a sign of the determination of
protectionists to make their duties workable, as of moderation 26.
The Transition from Free Trade to Protection
To explain the transition from free trade to protection It IS
necessary briefly to consider the politics of the tariff issue. In a
broad extra-parliamentary sense the politics of Queensland's first
two decades, after an initial phase of squatting hegemony, were
dominated by the squatters and the town liberals. At its peak in
the mid-'sixties, squatting influence was steadily chipped away by
the urban groups. This reversal of strength was accelerated in
the mid-'seventies by expansion in the sugar and mining industries,
rail construction and urbanhuiJding. From the mid-'seventies to
the mid-'eighties urban middle class radicalism had a prestige
which it previously lacked. Then, as the squatters' primacy had
been challenged by the liberals, the liberals were themselves found
wanting by the labour movement. Economic diversification in the
early 1880s was again the basis for this new alignment 27. This
is a simplified picture and Allan Morrison's opinion, that the
period between 1860 and 1890 was 'one of faction among different
types of property owners, rather than of growing party schism on
a basis of principle', must also be considered 28. However, if
economic legislation is a touchstone of political dividing lines then
parties did emerge earlier in Queensland than in New South
Wales 29.
In relating these groups to the tariff there were some fixed
interests that can be readily identified. Squatters opposed any
tax on stock imports and were unenthusiastic about encouraging
manufacturing or agriculture; expansion in those sectors would
deprive them of capital and labour. The commercial urban middle
classes supported the squatters' free trade principles, while the
much smaller urban industrial middle class endorsed protection.
For their part, urban industrial workers came to a position of
qualified support for their employers' case for manufacturing pro-
tection but opposed duties on agricultural produce. Workers also
protested vigorously against food, drink, clothing, and tobacco
taxes. Lastly, farmers wanted wheat imports taxed and
agricultural machinery exempted but did not usually support
millers' claims for a flour tax 30.
These interests were most influential in south Queensland.
In the north, sugar and mining were especially important. Planters
were protectionist. They supported duties on imported sugar and
the exemption of sugar machinery from duties. Miners opposed
protection, notably on food, drink, tobacco, and mining supplies,
although mine owners demanded that their machinery should
receive the same preferential treatment as sugar machinery. There
was very little manufacturing industry in the north and little
agricultural or manufacturing production in central Queensland.
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Although it can be misleading to describe the regional fiscal
differences in a blanket fashion, it is clear that the south had the
most to gain from protection and the centre had the least reason
to support it 31.
Why the first phase of the tariff was free trade and why
protection followed can now be outlined. In the .1~60s and 1.870s
squatters and laissez faire liberals were the pohtically dommant
groups, hence free trade. In the 1880s. and 1890s labo~r beca~e
influential and the liberals less laissez fazre, hence protectIOn. ThIS
formula is too tidy but the qualifications necessary to make the
description historically accurate reinforce i~. To begin with,
agrarian political influence became more wIdespread after the
1870s. The Downs repurchase campaign of the later 1870s was
at last having results and a great deal was hoped for from the
1884 land act 32. When little agricultural growth materialised,
the urban radicals who previously had pressed for agricultural
settlement became more interested in labour radicalism. Bruce
Mansfield has shown how in New South Wales farmers and
workers were divided on the fiscal issue 33. In Queensland more
of a rapprochement was possible between the two. There were
exceptions to this rule. Non-industrial workers without any
reason to support protection were incensed by Downs farmers'
demands for agricultural duties. Yet in the early 1890s some
labour representatives were elected by farrr;ti~g constituencies 34.
However at that time farmers were not pohtlcally strong enough
to be a ~aluable ally for labour. In 1900 Queensland cultivated
the smallest amount of land per head of any of the colonies 35. If
the farmers were a weak ally they also tended to be an unwanted
one. After the early 1890s Queensland labour did not construct
a comprehensive rural policy until 1913 36.
Another factor in the move towards protection was the
expansion of sugar and mining. Even before the 1880s sugar
imports were taxed and sugar machinery was usually exempted,
yet mining was not assisted. Northern miners and mine owners
accordingly added tariff reform to their list of injuries in cam-
paigning for separation. This still did not make the north a
bastion of free trade after the 1880s. The fiscal issue in the north
(and centre) was concerned primarily with securing better treat-
ment for special regional needs 37. If the north had formulated
its own tariff it would have been a mixture of protection and
free trade which would have given pride of place to the north's
regional needs. McIlwraith realised this when he remarked in
1888 that if parliament agreed to a differential scale for the north
then the likelihood of separation would be increased 38. On the
grounds of his earlier Victorian experience he argued that northern
miners would come round to protection. In a broader sense than
the tariff he was right. In 1J99 the inland miners voted for
Federation and a White Australia 39.
The third qualification to the explanation of the transition
to protection is that labour was not solidly protectionist. The
depression brought this out. After a higher tariff had been placed
on imported boots and shoes in 1890 the workers concerned went
on strike because employers had not passed on the benefits by
increasing wages 40. Another labour objection was registered the
following year. At a meeting of the Queensland Protection League,
Mat Reid, a Brisbane working man's leader and an ex-member of
Hyndman's English Social Democratic Federation, had insisted
that state-aided immigration would have to cease before workers
would support protection.
The boot manufacturers had been protected and what had
been the result? The employers had filled their factories
with boys. (Cheers.) We had protected flour, and what
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was the consequence? The price of bread was going up
to 3td. a loaf, although thousands of people were starving.
(Commotion.) 41.
Despite this protest, in more normal economic times Queensland
labour, especially in the south, was sympathetic to protection so
long as manufacturers shared their profits with employees and so
long as food prices were not greatly increased.
The Wider Decline of Laissez-Faire in Queensland
The transition to protection cannot be properly understood
unless it is seen as part of the government's increasing role in the
colonial economy. The reasons for the importance of the state in
Australian economic life are well known. Traditions of authority
were implanted by the convict experience and there was a need
for constant resort to public enterprise in a geographical environ-
ment that was unfriendly to individual effort 42. What has
received less historical attention is how the state's role was justi-
fied at a time when the prevailing economic orthodoxy was non-
interference. Recently C. D. Goodwin has argued that advocates
of government activity put forward their claims piecemeal. 'They
endorsed land reform, tariffs, or a national bank, but seldom the
basic rationale of strong government'43. Such an interpretation is
understandable from the viewpoint of a historian trying to recount
the development of economic thought, but for practically minded
contemporaries this distinction probably would have been un-
acceptable. In economic affairs Australians often were pragmatic,
but this flexibility did. not necessarily indicate a piecemeal
approach. The colonists' main concern was economic develop-
ment and the tariff, land, railway, and immigration policies were
seen as different means leading to that end.
The state's role was a large one even in Queensland's early
years. The 1860s Land Order scheme was intended to link
immigration and land sales. The first railway was built by the
government. Subsidies were offered for cotton and sugar pro-
duction, and a manufacturing industries assistance Act was passed
in 1869 44 • Yet, as the treatment of the Queensland Steam
Navigation Company shows, these innovations were not made
without some soul-searching. The Q.S.N. had been founded to
break the monopoly that the Sydney based Australasian Steam
Navigation Company had of the Queensland coasting trade. After
some early successes the Q.S.N. ran into difficulties, but when its
mail contract came up for parliamentary renewal in 1865 there
was a lack of support for the 'project because it verged on public
enterprise 45.
Yet doctrinaire liberalism had a comparatively brief reign in
Queensland. The prestige of Manchester School economics reached
a peak in England between the repeal of the Corn Laws and the
onset of the 'Great Depression', a period of about twenty-five
years 46. Laissez faire in Queensland lasted little more than ten
years. Sharp dividing lines are neither possible nor desirable but
land legislation can act as a guide. Douglas's 1876 Land Act
marked the influence of a new radicalism in colonial politics, yet
the Act had no more success than its predecessors in fostering
agricultural settlement. As a laissez faire measure it also had no
ideological basis. The next major effort to resolve the land
question was made by Dutton in 1884 47 • It too failed but it was
different from the 1876 Act in a way which is relevant to the
decline of laissez faire. Dutton's Act owed its inspiration to
Henry George, the American single-taxer who was one of the few
intellectual influences on the Australian labour movement. George
was not a socialist but he was an ardent labour sympathiser; his
emphasis on 'true free trade', as opposed to a revenue tariff,
meant the use of the state to levy a direct land tax, as distinct
from the indirect tax effects of any tariff 48. So the 1884 Act may
be regarded as a symbol of the wider change in attitudes towards
state involvement. From that time on, the land question and
other major economic issues became more characterised by the
positive use of the state.
There were more signs of this change in the mid-'seventies.
The Encouragement of Native Industries Act of 1869 had been
intended to stimulate industrial growth by land grants. It had a
negligible effect and was repealed in 1875 after being condemned
as a breach of free trade principles. It had exerted 'a decidedly
demoralising effect' on the community 49. Examples of the move
away from economic liberalism in the mid-'eighties were less
striking but the government began systematically to foster techno-
logical change. After the 1884 drought a policy of artesian well
boring was undertaken. In 1885 £50,000 was granted to build
central sugar mills on co-operative lines near Mackay, and £10,000
was provided for mines in need of capital for deep-reefing. In
1887 the Department of Agriculture was created, and funds were
granted to erect a rabbit proof border fence. Lastly, in 1889,
the government began the system of travelling model dairies 50.
In the ten years after 1874 the increased political power of
urban middle class radicalism had helped commercial liberalism
to become a relatively doctrinaire set of beliefs. But if the political
strength of the radicals had increased, their effectiveness was
limited by their environment. The 1876 land act and the 1875
Immigration Act failed to lead to agricultural settlement, Kanakas
were re-introduced in the sugar industry in 1892, and the local
government Acts were imposed from above rather than developed
from beneath 51. And this was the reason why laissez faire was
short-lived in Queensland. It was inappropriate in colonial con-
ditions. Overseas experience may also have had a salutary effect,
as the decline of Manchester School economics was beginning to
be acknowledged in England by the end of the 1870s 52. The
development of the colonial tariff from free trade towards pro-
tection must be seen against this wider background to be appre-
ciated.
The Tariff and Federation
To conclude the discussion of the tariff debate, Federation
deserves some special comment. In the 1899 Federation Refer-
endum the colony returned a very small 'yes' majority of 38,000
votes to 31,000 'no' votes. The north and centre, with the
exception of Rockhampton, strongly supported Federation. The
south, especially Brisbane, the South Coast, and the North Darling
Downs, had been opposed 53. Although the history of Queens-
land's role in Federation still needs to be written there are two
useful preliminary studies. The first of these, following Parker's
pioneering 1949 article, has emphasised the economic and fiscal
reasons for the vote 54. The second, more in line with Blainey
and Bolton, has argued that nationalism was a stronger force in
Shipping, Jetty Wharf, Townsville, 1901.
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the north 55. In fact the geographical pull of regionalism could
cut right across economic or nationalist dividing lines, or reinforce
them. Political labour, for example, had no official policy on
Separation or Federation. Queensland's history has been a study
in distance and isolation and rarely was regionalism so decisive
as at the time of Federation 56.
Brisbane was closest to the border of any of the colonial
capitals and Queensland was the only colony where intra-colonial
separation had been such a long-standing issue. The bulk of the
population and industry was in the south. The developed re-
sources of the north and centre were almost equal but the centre's
position was more vulnerable. As well as domin~ting agricultural
a~d . manufacturing production, the south had important sugar,
mmmg, and pastoral industries, and had achieved a degree of
economic diversification. Pastoral, sugar, and mining production
were also dominant in the north, while mining and the pastoral
industry were the mainstays of the centre. It was in this context
that complaints about tariff discrimination were made that the
cost of living in the north and centre had been inflated'to benefit
the south 57.
As established exporters, northern sugar growers miners and
pastoralists had little to gain from inter-colonial prot~ction, ~hile
distance sheltered the north from commercial rivalry coming from
Brisbane or Sydney. South Queensland had always felt the pressure
of New South Wales rivalry more keenly than the centre or north.
Whereas Adelaide could defend her coasting trade with the Adelaide
Steamship Company, the principal Queensland service, the
Australasian United Steam Navigation Company, was Sydney based
and owned. Local shipping had been more successful in north
Queensland 58. Consequently the south's proximity to New South
Wales and its different economic structure reversed the balance of
fiscal interest. Even southern sugar districts, such as the Logan,
opposed Federation 59. The evolution of local government in the
colony was also a factor. Townsville and Rockhampton had
appointed Harbour Boards in 1895 to control their ports as part
of their campaign for separation and local government. Brisbane
had not felt the need to follow suit. Brisbane was the contented
centre of government and was unwilling to change a situation that
was working well enough. Townsville and Rockhampton, in con-
trast, had the incentive of Separation and Townsville already had
more commercial links with Sydney 60.
Considering this regional background, it is unreasonable to
see south Queenslanders as parochial and materialistic for not
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diction that Federation would mean the ruin of Queensland's
manufacturing industries was largely borne out 61. It is equally
misleading to see northerners as more patriotic because of their
enthusiasm for Federation. It would benefit them directly. The
north had a special concern for defence, yet no-one argued that
this was parochialism, although it was as much a particular
regional problem as was the potentially vulnerable position of
southern manufacturers and farmers 62.
Central Queensland's experience bears out this interpretation.
Though the inland was pro-federal, Rockhampton was opposed. This
was a mixture of the south and north's reaction because of the
centre's median position. Rockhampton was desperately con-
cerned about her commercial future. The coastal rail line had
reached Gladstone in 1896 and was approaching Rockhampton,
so the danger of southern commercial competition and Gladstone's
rivalry was in the air. The deep water port issue had been another
factor in the centre. Pastoralists favoured either Port Alma or
Broadmount while Rockhampton rarely could see past the advan-
tages of improving the Fitzroy River. This contributed to the
inland's distrust of Rockhampton. In contrast to Townsville or to
inland central Queensland, Rockhampton felt the need to put
Separation before Federation 63.
Under these circumstances the tariff assumed a new import-
ance in the late 1890s. In 1892 the Brisbane Courier described
the postponement of Federation on account of inter-colonial fiscal
differences as a matter for regret, but at least it proved the
inadvisability of internal separation. The newspaper commented
that 'were Queensland divided into three colonies a tariff war
would be waged that must prove mutually destructive' 64. Seven
years later The Telegraph interpreted the referendum result entirely
in regional terms 65. It must be concluded, therefore, that
regionalism was the primary influence on the Queensland Feder-
ation vote and that the tariff issue had been brought up again not
as a matter of commercial principle but as a means of inter-regional
complaint 66.
Conclusions
This examination of the tariff's development has only been a
preliminary one, but it is clearly inaccurate to lump Queensland
with the smaller Australian Colonies and conclude that its fiscal
policy was half-way between New South Wales' and Victoria's.
There is no good reason why the southern Colonies should be
regarded as more Australian than Queensland. It is important to
recognise that Queensland had an early phase of free trade followed
by protection. These policies were the result of influences from
within Queensland. They were not externally induced by south-
ern pressure. There is a strong centralist tradition in Australian
historical writing but it does great harm to consider Queensland's
history in New South Wales or Victorian terms.
Secondly, the movement towards protection should be seen
as part of Queensland's wider dissatisfaction with state non-
interference in economic life. The 1879 land act and the repeal of
the Encouragement of Native Industries Act in 1875 were the
high-water mark of laissez faire. With the host of small but
cumulatively decisive measures taken in the 1880s Queensland
moved into the realm of active state participation in the economy.
Lastly, by the mid-'nineties the tariff issue only occupied a
place in the political background. The imminence of Federation
brought it to attention but it was the issue's regional aspects
which were most controversial. Northerners were not any more
patriotic because of their support for Federation at that time than
south Queenslanders. It was to their own regional interest in
terms of the tariff and defence.
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